Abstract: At present, with the popularisation of body sensor networks, more and more people concern the problem of personal privacy. Because the key negotiation schemes are the core technology to protect personal privacy, this paper provides two energy efficient key negotiation schemes for body sensor networks deployed on the surface of the human body which are the most 56
practical applications. In our work, we first point that single-hop transmission is more energy efficient than multi-hop transmission, and then, based on the single-hop transmission and star network structure, we use fuzzy commitment technology to establish shared keys between biosensors and PDA under weak time synchronisation mechanism, and use a modified fuzzy extractor technology to establish shared keys between PDA and the remote medical centre. Analyses show that our scheme are more efficient than existing researches, and are suitable to practical body sensor networks.
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Introduction
Body sensor networks (BSNs) are a special kind of wireless sensor networks (WSNs), and comprise dozen of biosensors. These biosensors in a BSN are deployed inside or on the surface of the human body, and form a self-organising wireless network. BSNs use their biosensors to collect physiological signals from the human bodies and send these signals to the remote medical centre in real-time, which realise continuous and automatic monitoring of human health and can greatly improve the quality of life. So BSNs play an important role in the so-called 'smart health' (Axisa et al., 2005; Foad et al., 2013) .
Recently, people gradually realise that messages collected and delivered by BSNs should be protected for personal privacy reason (Hu et al., 2010) . So BSNs should provide security services such as confidence, authentication, integration, and so on (Huang et al., 2011) . All of these security services are based on key negotiation schemes that are critical technology to secure BSNs.
BSNs are a special kind of WSNs, while traditional key negotiation schemes for general WSNs are not suitable for BSNs (Zhao et al., 2012a (Zhao et al., , 2012b , for BSNs have their own characteristics as follows:
key management schedules to distribute key management responsibility among all biosensors in a BSN. The intention of the scheme is to balance energy and prolong the lifetime of BSNs, but it ignores the fact that the use of key management schedules needs time synchronisation mechanism which will consume much energy to broadcast time synchronisation messages.
Due to existing of high-entropy physiological signals, a bio-cryptography technology which combines traditional cryptography and biometric security, called as fuzzy commitment was proposed in Cherukuri et al. (2003) : Suppose A and B are two biosensors, and they specify a secret error-correcting code C and a kind of high-entropy physiological signal in advance. When A wants to negotiate a shared key with B, A collects a value x of the pointed signal, and selects a secret codeword c from C. And then, A computes and sends the following message to B: x′ If e is tolerated to the error-correcting code C, B recovers c that can be used as the shared key between A and B. The authors in Cherukuri et al. (2003) argue that the scheme is a non-interactive key negotiation protocol, and could save great energy in BSNs. However, due to high-entropy trait of physiological signal, A and B only can collect similar value of a physiological signal under accurate time synchronisation. As mentioned above, accurate time synchronisation will consume great energy in broadcasting time synchronisation messages.
Following the work in Cherukuri et al. (2003) , many researches are developed to improve it. The scheme in Bui and Hatzinakos (2008) proposed an optimisation method that only delivers commitment when negotiating shared keys and will consume less communication energy than the scheme in Cherukuri et al. (2003) . Mesmoudi and Feham (2011) considered the disturbance among adjacent BSNs, and provided a key negotiation scheme based on pre-distributed key and fuzzy commitment. The scheme designs a mechanism to replace a cluster head when its energy reaches a minimum value of a threshold, which will balance energy of the whole BSN. Cho and Lee (2012) improved fuzzy commitment technology in key negotiation, and proposed a multi-commitment scheme that can protect the codeword in error-correcting code. Though a lot of fruits are achieved, some problems are left unsolved yet in key negotiation schemes for BSNs, for instances, how to build an energy efficient topology for key negotiation? How to negotiate shared key between BSNs and the remote medical centre? The two questions are included in what we want to solve in the paper.
After fuzzy commitment technology, another bio-cryptography technology, called as fuzzy extractor, was advanced in Dodis et al. (2004) . Fuzzy extractor comprises two parts, Gen and Rep, that operate as follows: Assume W is a variable denoting a high-entropy physiological signal, and w and w′ are two values of W. Gen holds w, and when it wants to negotiate a shared secret with Rep, it computes (R, P) = Gen(w), where R is a secret value and P is an open value that is delivered to Rep. Rep holds w′ and when it receives P from Gen, it computes Rep( , ).
If the distance between w and w′ is tolerated to a pointed error-correcting code C, Rep can recover R, or in other words, . R R′ = And then, Gen and Rep share a common secret R. Based on the work in Dodis et al. (2004) , a robust key negotiation scheme is proposed in Heinzelman (2000) . The robust attribution of the scheme lies in that it can protect the integrity of P. In addition, the scheme can decrease the entropy loss of fuzzy extractor structure. However, to the best of our knowledge, fuzzy extractor technology has been not used to negotiate keys in BSNs yet.
Network topology of BSNs on the surface of the human body
There are two kinds of biosensors in BSNs, implantable biosensors and wearable biosensors. Because implantable biosensors have high technological requirements and always are used in special smart treatment, many BSNs in practical applications only comprise wearable biosensors. This kind of BSNs is deployed on the surface of the human body, and can collect and send physiological signals to the remote medical centre to realise health monitor in real-time. Since these signals include personal privacy information, in this paper, we focus on how to design energy-efficient key negotiation schemes for this kind of BSNs. And first of all, we will discuss what topology should be adopted in key negotiation in order to save energy.
Because the kind of BSNs we concern are used to monitor health, biosensors in them only take the charge of collecting physiological signals and sending these signals to an adjacent PDA, and they do not need to communicate with each other. Thus, the structure of this kind of BSNs should be a star shape network.
In addition, as mentioned in Bui and Hatzinakos (2008) , the computational energy costs in biosensors are typically smaller so much that they are almost negligible compared to the energy cost of communication. Based on it, we put our emphasis on energy cost of communication in biosensors, and what we focus on is that whether single-hop transmission or multi-hop transmission is energy efficient for the kind of BSNs.
Energy consumption of CC2430
At present, the CC2430 is a true system-on-chip (SoC) solution specially tailored for IEEE 802.15.4 and Zigbee applications, and is widely used in biosensors as transceivers. In the situation, we use CC2430 as a model to analyse biosensors' energy consumption in transmission.
Wearable biosensors transmit messages in the air, which is the same to conventional transmission in WSNs, so we can use the following classic energy equations for transmission in WSNs provided in Heinzelman (2000) to research the energy consumption of CC2430:
where E elec is energy consumption of sending or receiving per bit; ε amp is energy consumption of transmit amplifier sending per bit in per square metres; l is the quantity of bits transmitted; d is the distance of transmission; k (2 ≤ k ≤ 4) is attenuation index according to surroundings. In BSNs, the transmission of CC2430 is less than 2 metres, as the research in Heinzelman (2000), we can let k = 2. According to introduction in Chipcon (2005) , in the best link quality of CC2430, the current is 26.9 mA, and the volt is 3.0 V, and the data rate of CC2430 is 250 kbps, and then we can get E elec = 26.9*3/(0.25*10 6 ) = 322.8 nJ/bit. In addition, the receiver threshold is -92 dbm that is approximately equal to 6.3*10 -4 nw, and the wavelength of the carrier signal λ = (3 × 10 
( ) (322.8 )
Analysis of single-hop and multi-hop
From equation (3), it can be seen that in short-distance transmission the energy consumption is little relevant to the distance. Suppose that the transmission distance is 1 metre, and then in single-hop the total energy consumption of transmission is: Figure 1 shows the comparison of single-hop and multi-hop. From Figure 1 , it can be concluded that single-hop is more efficient than multi-hop for BSNs on the surface of the human body. So, we will use the topology with star structure and single-hop transmission (shown by Figure 2 ) to design key negotiation schemes. In Figure 2 , PDA is a portable device that not only communicates with all biosensors in a BSN to control them and receive physiological signals from them, but also communicates with remote medical centre by GPRS or 3G channel. In addition, in order to support bio-cryptography, we suppose PDA is deployed on the surface of human body and can collect ECG signals and fingerprint (Khan et al., 2013) .
Key negotiation schemes for BSNs on the surface of the human body
In Section 3, we have pointed out that the topology with star structure and single-hop is energy efficient for BSNs on the surface of the human body, and then in this section, we design key negotiation schemes for the kind of BSNs based on the topology shown in Figure 2 .
Key negotiation between biosensors and PDA
With the development of integrated circuit technology and sensor technology, a biosensor can integrate multiple sensors to collect various physiological signals. In this condition, we suppose each biosensor can collect ECG signal to negotiate shared key with PDA, for ECG could be collected from different sites of the human body and has high entropy. Thus, we use fuzzy commitment technology to design a key negotiation scheme for biosensors and PDA.
Fuzzy commitment technology needs time synchronisation, and to solve the huge energy consumption in time synchronisation, we adopt the weak time synchronisation mechanism that was proposed in Zhao et al. (2013) . And based on weak time synchronisation and fuzzy commitment technology, our key negotiation scheme is present as follows:
In our design, biosensors and PDA share a secret error-correcting code C where all of code words are secret. Besides, PDA allocates a space to store discrete values of ECG signals during a fixed time window. When the next time window comes, new discrete values will replace the old ones. When a biosensor wants to share a key with PDA, it selects a secret code word c from C and collects a new value x from ECG signals, and then it computes F(x, c) = h(c) || (x ⊕ c). Finally, it sends F(x, c) to PDA. When PDA receives F(x, c), it will look for the matched value from the current time window by the following method: to each discrete value x′ in the current time window, PDA computes , x x c ′ ⊕ ⊕ and then uses C to correct x x c ′ ⊕ ⊕ to get , c′ finally, PDA checks whether ( ) h c′ is equal to h(c).
x′ is the matched value which means , x x ′ = and PDA can get c by x ⊕ x ⊕ c = c. Thus, c can be used as the shared key between biosensor and PDA. Otherwise PDA will check other discrete values in the current time window.
In the worst case, PDA does not find the matched value in the current time window. The case is not considered in (Khan, 2013) , and here we propose a method that can help PDA to get the matched value. In order to make the method clear, we explain it by a simple example:
Suppose the shared error-correcting code C = {000, 111} maps a bit string x ∈ {0, 1} 3 to 000 if at least two bits of x are 0s and to 111 if at least two bits of x are 1 s. Thus, C can correct a single error. Let a biosensor selects a secret codeword c = 000 and collects a discrete physiological bit string 111, then the biosensor will send h(000)||(000 ⊕ 111) to PDA. If there are two bit strings, such as 100 and 010, in the current time window of PDA, PDA will get 100 ⊕ 000 ⊕ 111 = 011 and 010 ⊕ 000 ⊕ 111 = 101, and both 011 and 101 cannot be corrected into codeword 000, for C will correct both 011 and 101 into 111. In this case, PDA will search the matched bit string by calculating the existing bit strings in the current time window. For instance, PDA adds 010 by 1 to get 011, and then gets 011 ⊕ 000 ⊕ 111 = 100. Next it uses C to correct 100 and gets 000.
PDA knows 000 is the just code word selected by the biosensor. It can be concluded that in our scheme biosensors can negotiate a shared key with PDA by one time of transmission, which greatly saves biosensors energy. To PDA, though it requires a little more computation overhead, the computation overhead is bearable for two reasons: the one is PDA has much more energy than biosensors and can be easily recharged; the other one is that compared to communication energy, the computation energy is negligible.
Key negotiation between PDA and the remote medical centre
The security of the communication between PDA and the remote medical centre also is an important part in the security of BSNs, however, many researches ignore the communication or very generally speak that the communication could be realised by conventional security schemes based on symmetrical cryptographic system or asymmetrical cryptographic system. However, in symmetrical cryptographic system, PDA should have a security module to store a pre-distributed key shared with the remote medical centre, which not only increases the cost of PDA, but also increases the overhead of key management for the remote medical centre; in asymmetrical cryptographic system, a trust centre is required to distribute a pair of public key and private to each PDA and each PDA needs a trust module to store its private key, which will bring huge cost for the while system.
In this section, we make use of fingerprint to design an efficient key negotiation scheme for communication between PDA and the remote medical centre. Because the trait of fingerprint is not changed with time, fuzzy commitment technology is not available, so we will use a modified fuzzy extractor technology to design key negotiation scheme.
In our scheme, each PDA has a distinguish identifier code I like international mobile equipment identity (IMEI) code of subscriber identity module in mobile phone. Since PDA is always under the surveillance of user and I cannot be read out by the adversary, it is reasonable to assume that I is a secret value. In addition, when a user registers himself to the remote medical centre, the administrator writes the username u into his PDA, and collects the user's fingerprint w′ as his biometric template. Besides, PDA shares a secret error-correcting code C with the remote medical centre. PDA and the remote medical centre will compute H(I || (r ⊕ c)) as the shared key. Our scheme can be explained by Figure 3 .
The main difference between our scheme and the original fuzzy extractor is that we do not use physiological signals such as fingerprint to produce the shared key, it is because the fingerprint collected by PDA each time is various and different from the template in the remote medical centre.
Performance analyses
The key negotiation scheme in Section 4.1 saves energy in two aspects. One is that the key negotiation scheme is based on the topology adopting star structure and single-hop transmission mechanism, which means that biosensors will send messages to the remote medical centre directly. According to discussion in Section 3, the method will greatly save energy in BSNs. The other one is that we propose an improved weak time synchronisation mechanism, and based on the mechanism, fuzzy commitment technology does not need accurate time synchronisation, which could save much energy consumed by broadcasting many time synchronisation messages.
In addition, our scheme does not need to store pre-distributed keys in biosensors, which is superior to schemes in Muhammad et al. (2010) and Zhao et al. (2013) that are all key-predistributed schemes.
Because PDA has much more energy than biosensors, we do not discuss the energy efficiency in key negotiation scheme in Section 4.2. Here, we want to state that with the development of fingerprint identification technology, PDA can collect more accurate fingerprint, and w collected by PDA has smaller differences from w′ in the remote medical centre, which mean that the distance between w and w′ should be tolerate to error-correcting code, and PDA could negotiate a shared key with the remote medical centre in one time of transmission. So we can argue that the key negotiation scheme in Section 4.2 has high performance.
Security analyses
In the key negotiation scheme for biosensors and PDA, ECG value x as high entropy and can be looked as pseudo-random value. Generally, we suppose the length of x and code word c is 128 bits, and then when the adversary gets F(x, c) = h(c) || (x ⊕ c), it only can guess the right c with the probability of 1/2 128 . The key negotiation scheme for PDA and the remote medical centre can provide authentication service and confidence service. In authentication service, when the remote medical centre receives P = u || r || w ⊕ c ⊕ H(I || r || u) || H(I || r || c) and finds H(I || r || c) is a valid message, it will believe P comes from a valid PDA and w inputted by the user is similar to the template w′ which means the user is just the person who registers to the medical centre. In the worst case, both of PDA and the fingerprint could be stolen by the adversary, we argue that PDA is hardware, and in this case the user will find the attack in time and take measures to resist the attack. In confidence service, we suppose the lengths of w, c, r and I are all 128 bits. In this case, when the adversary gets P from the communication channel, he cannot compute H(I || r || c) for he does not know I and c, which means he only can guess the right c with the probability of 1/2 128 even he knows w by some methods. So we can conclude that the adversary can compute the shared key H(I || (r ⊕ c)) with negligible probability.
Conclusions
Recently, BSNs on the surface of the human body have been well developed, and the security of personal privacy is generally concerned by people. In order to protect security of the kind of BSNs, we research the characteristics of BSNs on the surface of the human body, and find single-hope is more energy efficient than multi-hop, and based on the topology with single-hop and star shape structure, we propose two key negotiation schemes. To secure the communication between biosensors and PDA, we use fuzzy commitment technology to transfer the committed shared key from biosensors to the PDA under an improved weak time synchronisation mechanism, which realises key negotiation in non-interactive protocol. To secure the communication between PDA and the remote medical centre, we proposed to use fingerprint to realise authentication and key negotiation under a modified fuzzy extractor technology. Analyses show that our schemes are energy efficient and secure for BSNs on the surface of the human body.
